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TESTIMONY FOR THE DEFENSE
Smith v. State'
In recent years there has been increasing public awareness of violence
against women, particularly women involved in violent relationships with
their mates. There is increased protection today for women, both from their
battering spouses and from their inability to extricate themselves from the
violent relationships.
This movement toward greater protection has traditionally been seen
in the areas of law enforcement and social work. In a handful of cases,
however, protection has been extended through the judicial system to women
who have assaulted or killed those who allegedly battered them. The
availability of the "battered woman syndrome" 2 as a defense in these cases
raises issues that are difficult but important.
Josephine Smith killed her live-in boyfriend.3 At trial, Smith's testimony
showed that she met the victim when she was 17 years old and later bore
his child, but she never married him. The deceased first struck her less than
a month after they met and continued to beat her periodically during the
following six years until his death. Following the beatings, the deceased
always apologized, said he would not strike her again, and told her he loved
her. In view of these promises, Smith never called the police or told her friends
about the beatings. 4
On the night of the shooting, the deceased made advances toward Smith,
but she told him she was not interested. A scuffle ensued, and the deceased
hit Smith in the head with his fist, choked her, and threw her against a door.
When Smith got loose, she grabbed a gun and ran downstairs to phone for
help; however, she was unsuccessful. Smith attempted to flee the apartment,
but the victim slammed the door on her foot. She then fired the gun three
times with her eyes closed, fled to a neighbor's house, and called the police.5
1. 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
2. "Battered woman syndrome" is defined in the text accompanying notes
24-32 infra.
3. 247 Ga. at 612, 277 S.E.2d at 678.
4. Id. at 613, 277 S.E.2d at 679.
5. Id.
835 1
Kultgen: Kultgen: Battered Woman Syndrome:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Other testimony showed that when the police arrived, they found the
victim with gunshot wounds in the head, neck, and abdomen.6 No officer
noticed any bruises on the defendant. Although Smith refused shoes because,
she said, her foot was swollen, no one noticed her limping.7
At trial, Smith claimed she shot her boyfriend in self-defense. 8 Her at-
torney attempted to introduce expert testimony to show that Smith honestly
believed she was in danger when she shot the victim because she suffered
from the battered woman syndrome, i.e., that due to a special psychological
condition caused by the prolonged period of beatings, Smith truly believed
she was in a life-threatening situation. 9 The syndrome is defined as a com-
bination of the stages of a battering relationship and the resultant
psychological condition.' 0 The condition is predominantly a combination
of a learned helplessness and a low self-image."
The trial court, however, ruled that the testimony was inadmissible
because the jurors were able to decide, without the aid of an expert, whether
Smith acted in fear. ' 2 The jury ultimately rejected Smith's assertions of self-
defense, and she was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. ' 3
Smith appealed her conviction on the ground that it was error to ex-
clude the expert's testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome. The
Georgia Court of Appeals' 4 upheld the trial court's exclusion, basing its deci-
sion on the rule that a witness cannot express an opinion concerning an
ultimate issue of fact because such testimony invades the province of the
jury. ' 5 The Georgia Supreme Court, in Smith v. State,' 6 reversed and held
6. Id. The medical examiner testified that any one of the three wounds could
have been fatal.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 612, 277 S.E.2d at 678.
9. Id. at 614, 277 S.E.2d at 680. The expert testified out of hearing of the
jury that typically the battered woman fears for her friends and herself, lacks self-
respect, and believes that her batterer will reform. See notes 38-41 and accompa-
nying text infra. The expert further testified that a study of the defendant revealed
that she possessed many of these characteristics. Smith's case history demonstrated
the existence of a six-year relationship between herself and the victim, highlighted
by frequent periods of abuse. The defendant continued the relationship because
she loved the victim, believed him each time he promised to end the abuse, and
was afraid that if she tried to leave, her life would be endangered. The expert con-
cluded that, in her opinion, Smith was a victim of the battered woman syndrome.
247 Ga. at 614, 277 S.E.2d at 680.
10, See text accompanying notes 24-32 infra.
11. See notes 28-32 and accompanying text infra.
12. 247 Ga. at 613, 277 S.E.2d at 679. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text
infra.
13. 247 Ga. at 613-14, 277 S.E.2d at 679.
14. Smith v. State, 156 Ga. App. 419, 274 S.E.2d 703 (1980), reversed, 247
Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
15. Id. at 419, 274 S.E.2d at 704.
16. 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
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that the expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome was im-
properly excluded from the jury's consideration.1 7 The Smith court said that
an expert's opinion on an ultimate issue is admissible when the expert's con-
clusion is one that jurors ordinarily cannot draw for themselves. 18 The court
determined that conclusions concerning a defendant's fear in a battering
situation are conclusions beyond the ordinary experience of the jury and,
therefore, are admissible.' 9 In support of its decision, the court relied on
the fact that other courts consistently have admitted expert testimony con-
cerning the battered child syndrome. 20
17. Id. at 619-20, 277 S.E.2d at 683.
18. Id. at 615-17, 277 S.E.2d at 680-82. The court emphasized the modern
trend to abandon the rule that an expert may not state his opinion on an ultimate
issue. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 12 (2d ed.
1972). The court pointed out that the Federal Rules of Evidence allow opinion
testimony to be admitted on the ultimate issue if it will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. FED. R. EVID. 702, 704.
The Smith court then pointed out that as early as 1939, Georgia recognized that
if the same elements that guide the expert can be comprehended by the jury, the
jury alone should form an opinion on ultimate issues. 247 Ga. at 616, 277 S.E.2d
at 681. If the knowledge of the expert exceeds that of the average person, however,
Georgia courts have held that the expert's opinion on an ultimate issue should be
admitted. Id. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, 189 Ga. 1, 9, 5 S.E.2d
214, 221 (1939).
19. 247 Ga. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683.
20. Id. at 617, 277 S.E.2d at 682. The battered child syndrome is a socio-
medical term used to characterize a clinical condition in children who have been
physically abused by a parent or guardian. Kempe, Silverman, Steel,
Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 A.M.A.J. 17, 17 (1962).
Typically, expert testimony concerning the battered child syndrome is presented
by the prosecution in an assault or homicide case where the parent is on trial for
beating or killing his child. The state calls a forensic pathologist or, in some cases',
a pediatrician who first testifies that he examined the victim's body. He then
describes the various fractures, bruises, ruptures, or internal injuries allegedly
resulting from the beating in question. He also describes any evidence of partially
healed wounds or scars that may have resulted from past beatings. Finally, he
testifies that, in his opinion, the child's injuries were not the result of a careless child's
play or an accident in the home but were most likely the result of an overzealous
display of discipline. See People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 505-07, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 919, 920-21 (1971); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 563-66, 247 S.E.2d
905, 908-09 (1978); State v. Best, 89 S.D. 220, 245-46, 232 N.E.2d 447, 458 (1975).
For a discussion of the use of a pathologist in child abuse cases, see Wecht & Larkin,
The Battered Child Syndrome-A Forensic Pathologist's Viewpoint, 1981 MED. TR. T. Q.
1, 18.
Expert testimony regarding the battered child syndrome differs drastically from
expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome. The expert in a bat-
tered child case is a physician who testifies that a child found with the described
injuries has not suffered those injuries by accidental means. The conclusion simply
relates to the source of injury and has nothing to do with the defendant's
3
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The Smith decision is significant because the Georgia court is one of only
a handful to hold that expert testimony concerning the battered woman syn-
drome is admissible. Of the few appellate courts that have addressed the issue,
only two have unconditionally admitted such expert testimony.2 1 A small
number of courts have stated that the testimony was admissible if a proper
foundation was laid concerning the expert's method of analysis, his qualifica-
tions, and the theory's acceptance within the relevant scientific community. 22
The remaining appellate courts, however, have unconditionally denied ad-
mission of the testimony.2 3 Thus, the Smith court has contributed to a growing
psychological makeup or state of mind. On the other hand, the expert in a battered
woman case is a psychologist who testifies regarding the circumstances surround-
ing a battering relationship and the defendant's reactions to that relationship. The
expert's conclusion concerns psychological differences between battered women and
normal women. Battered child syndrome testimony concerns the corpus delecti of
an assault, i.e., the evidence tending to show that the defendant committed the act.
Battered woman syndrome testimony relates to the mens rea of an assault, i.e., the
evidence tending to show whether the defendant had the requisite state of mind.
The difference between these theories raises a serious question as to whether the
admissibility of battered child syndrome evidence supports the admission of bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence.
The Smith court used more reliable precedent when it cited two cases holding
that battered woman syndrome testimony is generally admissible. See State v. Baker,
120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (1980) (admissible to rebut defendant bat-
terer's evidence of insanity); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639 (D.C.
1979) (admissible if proper foundation presented regarding acceptance of expert's
methodology in relevant scientific community).
21. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981); State v.
Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (1980). In Baker, the court allowed
the prosecution to call a psychologist to rebut the defendant batterer's evidence of
insanity. The psychologist, called as an expert witness on the battered woman syn-
drome, testified regarding the mental condition of a batterer involved in a batter-
ing relationship. The defendant had beaten his wife on numerous occasions before
he killed her, and the psychologist testified that wife-beaters are not necessarily men-
tally ill. 120 N.H. at 775, 424 A.2d at 173.
22, In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), the court held
that expert testimony relating to the battered woman syndrome was conditionally
admissible. The court remanded the case, however, because the record was insuf-
ficient to show that the expert witness was qualified or that her research methods
were accepted by the relevant scientific community. Id. at 637-39. See note 64 and
accompanying text infra.
In Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981), the court excluded expert
testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome because the defense did not
demonstrate adequately that the state of the art would permit a reasonable expert
opinion. Id. at 1377. The court specifically stated that it was not holding that ex-
pert testimony regarding the syndrome was always inadmissible. Id. at 1378. See
also People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1980).
23. Morrison v. Bradley, -Colo. App...., , 622 P.2d 81, 82 (1980)
(court disallowed expert testimony on battered woman syndrome as defense in
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/8
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
split of authority on the question of whether expert testimony concerning
the battered woman syndrome is admissible.
As mentioned before, the "battered woman syndrome" is a term used
to describe the stages of a battering relationship and the effects of each stage
on an abused woman. 24 Dr. Lenore E. Walker, a pioneer psychologist in
the study of battered women, has identified the three stages of a battering
relationship as: (1) a tension building stage in which minor incidents of verbal
and physical abuse occur; 25 (2) a violent battering stage in which the woman
is often seriously injured; 26 and (3) a compassionate stage in which the man
begs forgiveness, swears his love, and promises never to strike the woman
again.27 Dr. Walker has found that the repetition of this pattern causes the
woman to develop certain learned reactions. 28 The first stage becomes a red
flag, warning a woman that a severe beating will soon follow. 29 The sup-
pressed fear experienced by the woman in the first stage may be so discon-
certing that she may subconsciously welcome the second stage in order to
return to the peaceful third stage.3 0 The repeated disappointments resulting
from the batterer's false promises of reform in the third stage cause the
woman to develop a "learned helplessness,' '31 i.e., the woman believes hers
is an inevitable fate and she can do nothing to alter her situation.
32
wrongful death action, but declined to accept or reject validity of general theory);
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (1981) (court
excluded battered woman syndrome testimony on grounds that self-defense is within
understanding of average layman, expert's research methodology was not accepted
by relevant scientific community, and evidence's prejudicial impact outweighed
probative value).
24. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 56 (1979).
25. Id. at 56-59.
26. Id. at 59-65.
27. Id. at 65-70.
28. Id. at 55.
29. Id. at 57. Dr. Walker points out that many battered women are adept at
keeping the relationship in the first stage for years. Id. at 58. Women who have been
battered over a period of time, however, know that the first stage's minor batter-
ing incidents will escalate. Id. at 57. When the tension rises to a certain point, it
triggers the more serious incidents of the second stage. Id. at 59. Because the cycle
is repeated, the battered woman learns to recognize this pattern of escalation and
the point at which her mate loses control. For a description of a situation involving
the first and second stages of the cycle, see Comment, Defense Strategies for Battered
Women Who Assault TheirMates: State v. Curry, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 161,171-72
(1981).
30. L. WALKER, supra note 24, at 70.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Id. at 49-50. Dr. Walker states that repeated cycles of battering diminish
the woman's motivation to respond. Learned helplessness is concerned with "early
response reinforcement and subsequent passive behavior." Id. at 45. Once the
woman begins acting out of a belief of helplessness, her perception becomes reality
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Expert testimony related to the battered woman syndrome is useful to
the defendant because it helps dispel the average juror's misconceptions con-
cerning a battering relationship. Three prevalent myths exist concerning
battering relationships. First, no matter how sympathetic people might be,
they frequently believe that the reason a woman remains with her batterer
is because she is masochistic. 33 Second, much of the public believes that bat-
tered women are mentally ill. This is similar to the first myth in that it at-
tributes the existence of the battering relationship to the woman's negative
personality characteristics.3 4 Third, it is widely presumed that the law en-
forcement system protects battered women. 35 In fact, the system often fails
to protect women from abuse.3 6
Some writers believe that social myths and prejudices concerning bat-
tered women cause the average layman to fault the female defendant for not
ending the relationship before it reached the point of no return. 37 Expert
33, Id. at 20. A source of this myth is explained in Comment, Does Wife Abuse
Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1705, 1708-09 (1978). The writer states that
some psychiatrists, including Freud, have asserted that battered wives are
masochistic and have characterized battered women as "aggressive, efficient,
masculine, and sexually frigid." Id. at 1708-09 (quoting Snell, Rosenwald & Robey,
The Wifebeater's Wife, 11 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 107, 111 (1964)). Some psychiatrists
believe that the beatings give these women masochistic satisfaction. Comment, supra,
at 1708-09. Dr. Walker asserts that these women are not masochistic but endure
the beatings because of a diminished motivation to respond. L. WALKER, supra note
24, at 47.
34. See L. WALKER, supra note 24, at 20-21. Often, a beaten spouse's behavioral
patterns earn her the label of crazy. Several women that Dr. Walker interviewed
reported being hospitalized for schizophrenia, paranoia, and severe depression. Id.
35. Id. at 26.
36. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense,
15 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 623,626 (1980). The legal system is hesitant to become
involved in domestic disputes largely out of respect for privacy rights. Comment,
The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a Defense to a Homicide Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, 26 VILL. L. REV. 105, 106 (1980). The courts traditionally have given deference
to the sanctity of the home and to the family relationship. Id. In addition to family
privacy, practical considerations have caused police departments to assign wife
abuse calls a low priority. First, more police are injured or killed answering domestic
calls than any other type of call. Id. See also Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense
Plea and Battered Women, 14 TRIAL 34, 36 (1978). Second, vague standards for ar-
rests and low conviction percentages have caused police who do respond to assume
the role of social worker rather than law enforcement officer. Comment, supra, at
106 n.12.
37. See W. RYAN, BLAMINGTHEVICTIM 1-11 (rev. ed. 1976); Schneider, supra
note 36, at 629. For examples of methods used by defense lawyers to demonstrate
public misconceptions and prejudices, see Lewin, Battered Women and the Doctrine of
Self-Defense: A Reevaluation of the Meaning of Deadly Force, 8 STUDENT LAW. 10, 11
(1980) (affidavits from local experts pointing out community's ignorance concer-
ning battering obtained to persuade judge to allow voir dire ofjurors concerning
[Vol. 47
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testimony can show the various reasons why the battered woman remained
with her mate. 38 These reasons may include economic dependence on the
victim, 39 low self-esteem that made the woman feel she deserved abuse or
that no one would help her,40 or constant fear that the male victim would
find her if she left and would punish her or her children for the attempt."'
Expert testimony concerning the syndrome also is valuable because it
can help the jury understand the reasons why the defendant believed she
needed to act in self-defense. 42 In order for the defendant to assert self-defense
successfully, she must show that she believed that she was in imminent
physical danger, used only that amount of force necessary to defend herself,
and acted reasonably in light of all known surrounding facts and
circumstances. 43 Expert testimony related to the battered woman syndrome
can explain why the degree of force the defendant used to prevent injury
was reasonable.4 4 The testimony can show that a battered woman becomes
familiar with behavioral cues from her batterer.45 Thus, what may seem to
have been an unreasonable degree of force to the average juror may have
seemed reasonable to an abused woman who recognized that her batterer
their beliefs about battering relationships); Comment, supra note 29, at 167-68
(defense counsel filed pretrial motion for appointment of expert on battered woman
syndrome and attached affidavits containing statements from doctors and social
workers recognizing community's lack of understanding of wife battering).
38. See Comment, supra note 29, at 172. Often, the question of why the defen-
dant stayed with her mate is presented by the prosecution when cross-examining
the defendant. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 633-34 (D.C.
1979).
39. Comment, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 895, 902 (1981).
40. Id. at 901. See L. WALKER, supra note 24, at 31.
41. See Comment, supra note 39, at 901.
42. See Comment, The Use of Expert Testimony in the Defense of Battered Women,
52 COLO. L. REV. 587, 587-93 (1981); Comment, supra note 29, at 169-75; Com-
ment, supra note 39, at 917-31. But see Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives, Self-Defense
and Double Standards ofJustice, 9J. CRIM. JUST. 389, 391-93 (1981) (claims by bat-
tered wives of excused homicide because of psychological factors have no legal
foundation).
43. W. LAFAVE &A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53 (1972).
There is a split of authority concerning the definition of "surrounding facts and
circumstances." One view is that an act of self-defense must be reasonable in light
of circumstances existing at the time of the killing. The modern view is that the act
must be reasonable in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defen-
dant. For a discussion of this split of authority, see note 49 infra.
44. L. WALKER, supra note 24, at 62-63. Dr. Walker explains that battered
women do not overestimate the potential danger when their mates threaten violence.
If anything, they underestimate the danger that could face them if they did not strike
first. See also Comment, supra note 29, at 172.
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had passed the point of control. 46 Such testimony also can help resolve issues
of fact concerning the imminence of physical danger.47 The expert testimony
can show that the battered woman's special familiarity with behavioral cues
alerted her to the imminence of harm before the moment her attacker ac-
tually moved to strike. 48
While expert testimony concerning the syndrome can prove valuable.
to an assertion of self-defense, there are problems with its admissibility. The
first objection raised is that syndrome testimony is irrelevant to the issue
of self-defense. As previously noted, the defendant must have acted
reasonably in light of all known facts and circumstances to assert self-defense
successfully. 49 There is a split of authority on whether the reasonableness
46. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979) (expert
testified that batterer's actions caused wife's state of fear, which led her to believe
she was in danger even though victim was standing in next room when she shot
him); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981) (excluded testimony of-
fered to show defendant's fear was reasonable even though she shot victim through
locked door after talking with him for over an hour).
47. See Comment, supra note 29, at 171. See also cases cited note 46 supra.
48. For a general discussion of the battered woman syndrome and the immi-
nent danger element of self-defense, see Comment, supra note 39, at 926-30.
49. Some courts have held that in order to assert self-defense, the defendant's
belief of imminent harm must be reasonable under the circumstances existing at
the time of the killing. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 240 Ill. 633, 640, 88 N.E. 1053,
1056 (1909); State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 143, 244 S.E.2d 397, 408 (1978). The
modern and more prevalent view, however, is that in order to assert self-defense,
the defendant's belief of imminent harm must be reasonable under all cir-
cumstances, whether past or present, known to him at the time of the killing. See
People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 303, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436 (1978).
An important example of the modern view is State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d
221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). In Wanrow, the court reversed Ms. Wanrow's convic-
tion for second degree murder because, in part, of trial court error with regard to
a self-defense instruction that read:
To justify killing in self-defense.., there must ... reasonably appear to
be, at or immediately before the killing, some overt act, or some cir-
cumstances which would reasonably indicate to the party killing that the
person slain is, at the time, endeavoring to kill him or inflict upon him great
bodily harm.
Id. at 234 n.7, 559 P.2d at 555 n.7. The Wanrow court emphasized the phrase "at
or immediately before the killing" and found that the phrase erroneously narrowed
the scope of the jury's inquiry into the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 236, 559
P.2d at 556. The court stated that Washington's law of self-defense called for the
jury's evaluation of the defendant's belief in light of all the facts and circumstances
known to him, including those known substantially before the killing. Id. at 234,
559 P.2d at 555. The court emphasized that it was important that the jury be able
to consider Wanrow's knowledge of the victim's past violent acts and reputation
for violence. Id. at 237-38, 559 P.2d at 557.
Writers discussing the use of battered woman syndrome testimony in self-defense
cases have suggested that Wanrow is precedent for introducing the battered woman's
circumstances into evidence. See Comment, supra note 42, at 591-93; Comment,
842 [Vol. 47
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of the defendant's actions should be measured by an objective or subjective
standard.5 0 Under the objective standard, the jury must determine whether
the facts and circumstances would have induced a reasonable person to act
in self-defense.5 1 The relevancy objection to the admission of syndrome
testimony is supported by the argument that the special beliefs and reac-
tions of a battered woman are not those of a reasonable person.5 2 The counter-
argument is that the battered woman's special beliefs and reactions are the
direct result of the surrounding facts and circumstances53 and, therefore,
that a reasonable person put in the same situation also would have those
beliefs and reactions.5 4 Under the subjective standard, the jury need not
supra note 39, at 920-26. These commentators suggest that the circumstances sur-
rounding the battered woman, including past beatings by the victim, her frustra-
tion due to unsuccessful efforts to solicit help from the police, and her general feel-
ing of worthlessness, influence her perception of the need to use self-defense-just
as past acts by the victim influenced Ms. Wanrow's perception of the need to de-
fend herself. See Comment, supra note 39, at 923.
50. The minority view and probably the common law rule is the subjective
standard as set forth in 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 154 (1968). It holds that a per-
son claiming self-defense must have honestly believed he was in imminent danger
under all the circumstances as he honestly perceived them. The Model Penal Code
has adopted the subjective standard. "The use of force.., toward another person
is justified when the actor believes that such force is... necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself ... ." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
The majority view is that the apprehension of danger and belief of necessity must
be a reasonable belief. 40 AM.JUR. 2D Homicide § 154 (1968). The prevalent view
is that an honest but unreasonable belief concerning the necessity of self-defense
merely negates malice aforethought and reduces the offense to voluntary
manslaughter. See, e.g., People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 680, 603 P.2d 1, 7, 160
Cal. Rptr. 84, 90 (1979). For some examples of the objective standard, see People
v. Rickman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 755, 761, 391 N.E.2d 1114, 1119 (1979); People v.
Moore, 43 Ill. App. 3d 521, 527, 357 N.E.2d 566, 570 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 245 Ga. 619, 623, 266 S.E.2d 221, 223-24
(1980).
52. Arguably, a reasonable person who has experienced physical abuse exer-
cises an instinct for survival and leaves the relationship before the abuse is repeated.
See generally notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 31 & 32 and ac-
companying text supra. In Rittenmeyer, supra note 42, at 393, the author suggests
that proponents of the battered woman syndrome as a defense in essence are pro-
moting a different standard of reasonableness for battered women than the stan-
dard imposed on the rest of society. Rittenmeyer criticizes this as giving a battered
woman a unique license to destroy her tormentor and creating a sex-based classifica-
tion violative of the due process and equal protection rights of male homicide defen-
dants and victims. Id. at 390.
53. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639 (D.C. 1979); Smith
v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 614, 277 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1981); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d
1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
54. See generally Schneider & Jordan, Representation of'Women Who Defend
Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 NAT'LJ. CRIM. DEF. 141, 153
(1978).
9
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decide what a reasonable person would believe, but rather what the defen-
dant truly believed. If a court uses the subjective standard, the argument
for admissibility is strengthened because the jury necessarily would have to
consider the defendant's special beliefs and reactions to decide whether she
truly anticipated danger. 55
A second objection to admitting syndrome testimony is that it allows
the expert to state his opinion on an ultimate issue of fact and, therefore,
to invade the province of the jury.5 6 The objection is supported by the fact
that expert testimony often presents an aura of special reliability and trustwor-
thiness to jurors.5 7 Thus, the expert's opinion, in fact, could decide the
ultimate issue for the jury. The majority rule for admissibility of expert
testimony, however, is whether the expert's opinion may help the jury in
its search for the truth. If so, it is irrelevant whether the opinion touches
on an ultimate issue. 58
A third objection to syndrome testimony is that it relates to a subject
within the experience of the average layman. 59 Arguably, fear and belief of
imminent danger are elements within the average juror's experience and
need not be explained by expert testimony. 60 Based on that premise, courts
55. See Comment, supra note 39, at 919.
56. See State v. Nelson, 306 So. 2d 745, 750 (La. 1975); Daniels v. State, 554
P.2d 88, 94-95 (Okla. Grim. App. 1976); Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 516,
519, 248 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1978).
57. See, e.g., State v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); Buhrle
v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
58. See, e.g., Diecidue v. State, 119 So. 2d 803, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960);
State v. Cunningham, 23 Wash. App. 826, 854, 598 P.2d 756, 772-73 (1979). See
also note 18 and accompanying text supra.
59. Expert testimony is appropriate when the subject of inquiry is outside the
normal experience and understanding of the jury. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d
827, 832 (D.C. 1977); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 248, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 728-30, 250 S.E.2d 749, 756-58
(1979); Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Wyo. 1977).
60. Mullis v. State, - Ga. -, -, 282 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1981). In
Mullis, expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome was inadmissible because
the testimony related to the defendant's reasonable fears, which could be com-
prehended by average jurors. This is a Georgia Supreme Court decision dated mere-
ly two months after Smith. Although the issue is the same, the court said that this
case was distinguishable from Smith simply because the fear of the defendant in this
case was within the comprehension of the jurors. The court did not elaborate on
its finding but specifically held that this decision did not overrule Smith. Id. It is
not clear from the opinion whether or not this is an attempt by the Georgia Supreme
Court to narrow its earlier decision. See also State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166,
610 P.2d 522, 524 (1980) (fear is a human emotion within understanding ofjury
and jurors are as capable as psychiatrist to determine whether defendant acted in
fear); State v. Jenkins, 260 N.W.2d 509, 513 (S.D. 1977) (expert testimony con-
cerning validity of defendant's assertion of duress excluded). Contra State v. Ellis,
89 N.M. 194, 197, 548 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Ct. App. 1976) (expert testimony that
844 [Vol. 47
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traditionally have excluded expert testimony concerning the defendant's state
of mind61 unless he has pleaded insanity. 62 The argument for admission of
syndrome testimony, however, is that in order to understand a defendant's
state of mind, the jury must understand the reasons why a defendant suf-
fering from the battered woman syndrome would not leave her mate, would
not inform police or friends of the abuse, and would fear imminent danger
in situations where a non-sufferer would not. These reasons are not within
the experience of the average layman.
63
Another argument for exclusion of syndrome testimony concerns the
reliability of the battered woman syndrome theory. Under the majority rule
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, an expert cannot give an
opinion based on a theory unless it is generally accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community. 64 Dr. Lenore Walker, one of the leading
defendant was in state of fear and shot in response to basic instinct for survival im-
properly excluded). Cf State v. Dickey, 125 Ariz. 163, 169, 608 P.2d 302, 308
(1980) (determination of whether defendant actually was fearful was within com-
mon experience ofjury; however, expert testimony on character traits, such as be-
ing overly protective and easily fearful, was admissible).
61. The courts find expert testimony on the defendant's state of mind irrele-
vant because it is an issue within the understanding of the jury. See, e.g., State v.
Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 382, 542 P.2d 804, 807 (1975); State v. Williams, 34 N.C.
App. 408, 415, 238 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1977); Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1198-99
(Wyo. 1977). But see, e.g., State v. Fish, __ Mont. ___, ,621 P.2d 1072,
1079 (1980); State v. Ellis, 89 N.M. 194, 197, 548 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Ct. App. 1976).
The essence of the rule is that predictive issues such as intent and motive can be
decided on the basis of common experience and that the mental health professional
has so little knowledge beyond the ordinary experience regarding intent that his
testimony is highly misleading. See Bonnie & Slogobin, The Role of Mental Health Pro-
fessionals in the Criminal Process: The Casefor Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427,
429 (1980). Perhaps a secondary reason for the courts' reluctance to allow expert
testimony on the defendant's state of mind is criticism of the clinical methodology
practiced by many mental health professionals. Id. at 429. See note 66 and accom-
panying text infra.
62. E.g., Bradshaw v. State, 353 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 765, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1974). Contra State v. Ellis,
89 N.M. 194, 198, 548 P.2d 1212, 1214-15 (Ct. App. 1976).
63. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979); Smith
v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683; notes 38-41 and accompanying
textsupra. Butsee State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139
(1981).
64. The general three-pronged test for admissibility of expert testimony is il-
lustrated by Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. App. 1977), in which the
court stated the requirements for admissibility: (1) the subject matter "must be so
distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be
beyond the ken of the average layman;" (2) "the witness must have sufficient skill
or experience in that field to make it appear that his opinion or inference will prob-
ably aid the trier in the search for the truth;'" and (3) the state of the pertinent art
1982]
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authorities on the battered woman syndrome, has admitted that many of
her research conclusions are tentative and that further research may be
necessary to confirm her contentions. 65 Additionally, the reliability of the
theory has been questioned because the method used by Dr. Walker and
many others to study battered women has been criticized as an unreliable
basis for analysis. 66 Although these reliability problems might indicate that
or scientific knowledge must permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted by an ex-
pert. Id. at 832.
The third prong, which requires that the theory be generally accepted as reliable
in the relevant scientific community, was explained in Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (1910). In Frye, the court stated that expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle must be "sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. In ap-
plying the Frye rule, the courts hold that the underlying scientific method used by
the expert in forming his opinion must be generally accepted. See People v. Kelly,
17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976) (voice print
analysis); State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 54, 622 P.2d 986, 991 (1981) (blood
test analysis); State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 812,585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978)
(breathalizer test analysis).
In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), the court applied
this interpretation of the Frye rule to the admissibility of expert testimony regard-
ing the battered woman syndrome. Id. at 637. The court stated that the third
criterion of the Dyas test dealt with the admissibility of expert testimony based on
new techniques of scientific measurement, citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d
741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) as authority. 407 A.2d at 638. The court found that the
Dyas criterion, as applied to the battered woman syndrome, was intended to test
whether the methodology used by the clinical psychologist to identify and study the
battered woman syndrome had reached the requisite point of acceptance in the rele-
vant field of inquiry. Id. at 638.
65. L. WALKER, supra note 24, at x-xi.
66. See note 64 supra. Dr. Walker used a case study method and compiled her
information concerning battered women from a "self-volunteered sample." The
women, therefore, were not randomly selected and, as Dr. Walker admits, cannot
be considered a legitimate data base from which to make specific generalizations.
L. WALKER, supra note 24, at xiii. Dr. Jay Ziskin, an attorney, clinical psychologist,
and the author ofJ. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY (2nd ed. 1975), has elaborated on two possible problems with the case
study method. First, Ziskin notes the need for a base rate when attempting to deter-
mine the significance of a particular behavioral pattern. Base rates refer to the ex-
tent to which a behavioral pattern exists in the general population. In order to assert
that a behavioral pattern is unique to a certain group of people, a psychologist must
have a base rate of that behavioral pattern with which to compare his data. Id. at
48. Failure to use a base rate can be damaging to an expert's credibility because
there is little to show he is dealing in an area concerning abnormal responses. Sec-
ond, Ziskin notes that there are variables in the clinical examination setting that
influence the outcome of each interview, including the examiner's personal in-
fluence, i.e., the particular questions he chooses to ask and the manner in which
he asks them, and the examiner's ability to observe, recall, and avoid repetition
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/8
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
syndrome testimony should be excluded, many courts have held that the
trial court, in its discretion, should determine the reasonable reliability of
proffered expert testimony and that any refutation evidence should bear on
the weight of the testimony, not on its admissibility. 67
The final objection to the admission of syndrome testimony is that the
testimony's prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.6 8 The testimony
tends to stereotype the victim as a wifebeater and the defendant as his helpless
mate. 69 As a result, the jury could punish the victim for his past acts instead
of deciding the issues of the case at hand. The counter-argument is that
evidence of th6 victim's past abusive acts toward the defendant is admissi-
ble on the issue of self-defense and that any additional impact of an expert's
opinion relating to the effect of that abuse is at most minimal.7 0
Any of the objections considered above could persuade a court to ex-
clude expert testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome. The ob-
jection that the testimony is irrelevant because the special beliefs and reac-
tions of a woman suffering from the syndrome are not those of a reasonable
person, however, may lack merit; there is a good argument that a reasonable
person surrounded by the same facts and circumstances as a battered woman
would develop the special beliefs and reactions explained by an expert's
syndrome-related testimony. The objection that syndrome testimony invades
the province of the jury is overcome by the majority rule that an expert may
testify to an ultimate issue of fact if the testimony will aid the jury in its fact
finding mission. Arguably, the objection that the defendant's state of mind
is within the understanding of the average layman lacks merit because the
battered woman's special beliefs, which the jury must evaluate in order to
understand her state of mind, are beyond a layman's everyday experience.
In addition, the undue prejudice argument lacks merit because, in the ma-
jority ofjurisdictions, evidence of a victim's past abusive acts toward a defen-
dant already is admissible on the issue of self-defense, and any additional
impact of an expert's description of the results of that abuse is minimal. On
of data. Id. at 129-30. These variables can be damaging to an expert's credibility
because they emphasize the possibility of manipulation of data inherent in the case
study.
67. Chafin v. State, 333 So. 2d 559, 608 (Ala. Grim. App. 1976); Gottardi
v. State, 615 P.2d 626, 630 n.9 (Alaska 1980); State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461,
469, 623 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1981). See also State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa
1980) ("general scientific acceptance" not a prerequisite to admission of expert
evidence if reliability of evidence is established otherwise).
68. State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 522, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
In all cases, this criteria must be met for expert testimony to be admissible. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 696 (Alaska 1970); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500,
504 (Me. 1978). Some courts have found that the special aura of trustworthiness
associated with expert testimony heightens its prejudicial value. See, e.g., United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
69. State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 522, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
70. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639 (D.C. 1979).
1982]
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the other hand, reliability problems may present a valid objection to the ad-
mission of syndrome testimony.
The reliability of an expert's testimony should be the most crucial test
for admissibility. This is true because laymen give great weight to an ex-
pert's opinion. Although many courts hold that reliability should determine
the weight of the testimony and not the admissibility, it is questionable
whether this is the actual effect on the jury. It is doubtful that a layman would
have the judgment to weigh the testimony according to its reliability instead
of giving it absolute credence.
In her study of battered women, Dr. Walker, the leading authority, has
indicated that the science is in its infancy. The methods used in the study
have been criticized in the scientific community. Until the theory and its
underlying basis are generally accepted as reliable, courts should exclude
syndrome testimony. Expert opinion is given too much weight by jurors to
admit it before it has been proven to be accepted. This is especially true in
a case where the whole issue of self-defense, and therefore absence of guilt,
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